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This Article addresses two central criticisms of the United
States Supreme Court's treatment of the issues raised by the
disputed Florida election and ultimately resolved in Bush v.
Gore: 1 that the Court violated principles of democratic process
and dramatically overstepped the boundaries ofjudicial review.
As will become apparent, the Article gives only modest atten-
tion to the text of the many opinions by the Florida and United
States Supreme Courts in the Bush v. Gore drama. It will be
an interesting question in the years ahead whether the formal
legal grounds set forth as the basis of the United States Su-
preme Court's per curiam decision or of any of the concurrences
or dissents will survive as plausible foundations for election ju-
risprudence. This Article ignores that question and, instead,
attempts to analyze the Court's various judgments during the
period of the dispute in a broader sense. Just as the purely le-
gal grounds of the United States Supreme Court's opinions in
cases such as Dred Scott2 or Brown v. Board of Education:l are
'John M. Olin Professor of Law and Economics, Yale Law School.
1. 531 U.s. 98 (2000). The United States Supreme Court issued three rul-
ings in the Florida election dispute: (1) Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board, 531 U.S. 70 (2000), issued on December 4, vacating the Florida Supreme
Court's opinion in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris, 772 So. 2d
1220 (Fla. 2000), overruling judgments of the Florida Secretary of State; (2) Bush
v. Gore, 531 U.s. 1046 (2000) (Bush v. Gore n, issued on December 9, staying the
statewide recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court; and (3) Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000) (Bush v. Gore In, issued December 12, permanently halting the
recount and effectively awarding the election to Governor Bush. Because the
criticisms of the United States Supreme Court that I address in Part I are di-
rected at the Court's various rulings generally, I will refer to "Bush v. Gore" with-
out distinguishing among the Court's rulings. The three rulings of the United
States Supreme Court as well as those of the Florida Supreme Court are dis-
cussed in more detail in Part II.
2. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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of less interest than the substantive judgments made by the
Court in its institutional role under the Constitution, so I be-
lieve the purely legal grounds of Bush v. Gore deserve less at-
tention now.
The most serious criticisms of the way that the United
States Supreme Court resolved the Florida election are not
that the majority opinion contains logical failures or ignores
conflicting precedent, however accurate such complaints might
be. The most serious criticisms are that the United States Su-
preme Court fundamentally breached its Constitutional role by
disregarding basic principles of the process of democratic ac-
countability and by committing what some commentators, in-
cluding my colleague Bruce Ackerman, have called "a Constitu-
tional COUp.,,4 This Article addresses those criticisms. Part I
considers the claim that the United States Supreme Court, by
overruling decisions of the Florida Supreme Court, abused the
political process and removed all possibility of accountability to
the citizenry. Part II examines the events in the Florida elec-
tion drama in more depth to analyze whether the United States
Supreme Court's various rulings improperly usurped power al-
located by the Constitution to the citizenry.
1. BUSH V. GORE AS A FAILURE OF PROCESS
This Part addresses the criticism by Michael C. Dorf and
Samuel Issacharoff in their interesting Article in this issue of
the Law Review, arguing that the United States Supreme
Court's resolution of the Florida election was inconsistent with
the political process theory to which the Court has been com-
mitted since United States v. Carolene Products. 5 At heart,
their criticism is that, by resolving the disputed election
through its own rulings, rather than by allowing the Florida
Supreme Court's rulings continuing the vote counting to stand,
the United States Supreme Court extinguished the possibility
that the Florida citizenry could hold any officer responsible for
the manner of dealing with the disputed election. As we shall
see, it is my view that the issue of accountability to the elector-
3. 347 U.s. 483 (1954).
4. Bruce Ackerman, Anatomy of a Constitutional Coup, LONDON REV.
BOOKS, Feb. 8, 2001, at 3.
5. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Michael C. Dorf & Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process
Theory Constrain Courts?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 923 (2001).
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ate is much more complicated than Professors Dorf and Issa-
charoff have described and that the criticism of the United
States Supreme Court on democratic process grounds requires
revision.
Professors Dorf and Issacharoff ascribe the political proc-
ess theory to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Carolene Products. As is well-known, in
Carolene Products' footnote four, the Court defined three cate-
gories of legislation to which there should be no presumption of
constitutionality and, thus, no (or less) deference by the judici-
ary to the decision of the legislature. The second of these cate-
gories is "legislation which restricts those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of unde-
sirable legislation."6
The political process theory derives from this idea. At
heart, it reflects a concern about the accountability of political
decisions and a commitment to ultimate political control by the
citizenry. The basic point of the process theory is that judicial
deference to democratic judgments of a legislature or of other
political actors may be suspended where those judgments are
in some way insulated from subsequent political accountability
to the citizenry. In this view, judicial review and subsequent
accountability to the citizenry are substitute means of control-
ling legislative action. In a democracy, political accountability
to the citizenry is superior as a democratic check than subse-
quent review by the courts. In contrast, where there is some
reason to believe that there are limitations on the ability of the
citizenry to hold political actors accountable, judicial review be-
comes more crucial.
As Professors Dorf and Issacharoff explain, a prototypical
example of the political process problem is the historical legis-
lative districting plans-which, for example, allocated a larger
number of representatives to rural farm than to urban areas
within a state-that were subjected to judicial review by the
Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr7 and Reynolds v. Sims.8 The
districting plans were largely invulnerable to political change
because the plans themselves diluted the political strength of
those citizens who might otherwise vote to amend them to shift
6. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 nA.
7. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
8. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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the distribution of representation. Because of this insulation
from democratic accountability, there were weaker grounds for
a court to defer to the judgment of the state legislature which
would otherwise have been thought to be the more democratic
institution. Though the political process theory seemed novel
and pathbreaking at the time,9 there is a venerable tradition to
a concern of this nature over political accountability. In
McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall defended the
supremacy of federal to state regulation of the Second National
Bank on the grounds that the citizens of the broader United
States had no political voice with respect to legislation enacted
in Maryland. lO
Note that the Court's phraseology in Carolene Products,
"legislation which restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable leg-
islation," does not fully express the idea. Legislation which re-
stricts political processes is one example of a constraint on sub-
sequent political accountability. But the basic proposition of
the process theory is broader and would extend to any political
actor and any political decision, beyond simply restrictive legis-
lation. According to the theory, where there are impediments
to the subsequent accountability of responsible political actors,
there should be no presumption either of the constitutional va-
lidity of legislation or of the legal appropriateness of the politi-
cal judgment.
Professors Dorf and Issacharoff criticize the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore on political process
grounds. According to Professors Dorf and Issacharoff, the
United States Supreme Court defined the issues so that it
would determine whether Bush or Gore would be President.
Because the members of the Supreme Court are totally inde-
pendent and, thus, beyond realistic democratic political ac-
countability, the citizenry possesses no means to tangibly ex-
press its political judgment of the Supreme Court's decision.
Like historical apportionment prior to Reynolds v. Sims,l1 the
decision can neither be overturned nor politically punished.12
9. Indeed, Professors Dorf and Issacharoff explain the many years it re-
quired for the theory to be worked out. Dorf & Issacharoff, supra note 5.
10. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 330 (1819).
11. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
12. In this respect, the decision appears similar to the pardons issued by
President Clinton in the last hours of his final term of office. It would be consis-
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Professors Dorf and Issacharoffs answer to this problem is
criticism by the academy. Although the Supreme Court cannot
be affected politically, it can be criticized-if not condemned (as
it has been)-by the legal academy. My colleague Bruce Ac-
kerman, not satisfied with mere condemnation, has gone fur-
ther and recommended that the "punishment" consist of a re-
fusal by the Senate to confirm any of President Bush's
appointments to the Supreme Court, effectively reducing the
membership of the Court if a currently sitting justice were to
retire. 13
Neither the academy's condemnation of the Supreme Court nor
the Senate's reduction of the size of the Supreme Court
through a refusal to confirm subsequent appointments, how-
ever, directly accords to the political process theory. There is
no doubt that there is some level of "punishment" reflected in
condemnation by the academy or by the Senate's refusal to con-
firm successor appointments. But the point of the political pro-
cess theory is democratic accountability to the citizenry, not
criticism or punishment in the abstract. To take an example
from Professors Dorf and Issacharoff, the billboards raised in
the South after Brown urging the impeachment of Earl Warren
were surely criticism, perhaps punishment, but they could not
be regarded as a triumph of political process.14 To the contrary,
the point of the political process theory is to make certain that
important political decisions and the political actors who make
those decisions remain accountable in some way to the citi-
zenry. Criticism by the academy or the Senate's refusal to con-
firm Supreme Court appointments does not in any serious way
serve to make the Supreme Court politically accountable to the
citizenry.
Academic criticism of the Supreme Court may damage
egos, but the most probable response of the Court is simply to
ignore the law reviews. Similarly, refusing to confirm Presi-
dent Bush's appointments to the Court may punish him politi-
tent with the political process theory to constrain a President to issuing pardons
only in periods in which the President retains some subsequent political agenda
through which he or she could be held accountable. See George L. Priest & Minor
Myers III, The Deeper Scandal Of The Clinton Pardons, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Feb. 26, 2001, at 9.
13. Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001,
at 48.
14. Dorf and Issacharoff accept this point, see supra note 5, at 936, though
their remedy of condemnation by the academy differs little.
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cally, but he was not directly responsible for the Supreme
Court's decision, and there remain other means of holding him
politically accountable as President. Does refusing to confirm
successor appointments punish those Justices who remain on
the Court? Not very effectively; it may only serve to justify the
Court's decisions to reduce its caseload.
The stronger argument is that the refusal to confirm ap-
pointments by President Bush will punish those Justices hop-
ing to retire and be succeeded by persons with similar views.15
Some commentators have implied that this concern over suc-
cession motivated some of the five-person majority agreeing to
the per curiam opinion.16 This remains an unsupported
chargeY It may well be true that a Justice considering retire-
ment will calculate how the timing of the decision will affect
subsequent Court membership. This consideration is probably
more important on a Court-like the present Supreme Court-
which has rendered so many decisions by a five-to-four vote. 18
But there are serious limitations to the accusation. First, it is
very difficult to predict the future decisionmaking of any Su-
preme Court appointee, as the unexpected attitudes of Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, among other recent appointees
demonstrate. Moreover, even members of the current Court
seem bound over some range by stare decisis;l9 the threat to
any Justice's prior jurisprudence is surely attenuated.
More importantly, however, this means of "punishing" re-
tiring Justices has no clear relation to political accountability
to the electorate. Again, the basic concept of the process theory
is to allow the electorate to determine who is to be held politi-
cally accountable. Refusing to confirm President Bush's nomi-
nees puts political power in the hands of the electorate only in
15. Ackerman, supra note 13.
16. [d.
17. My colleague, Jack Balkin, who has forcefully argued this point, quotes
an ambiguous remark by Justice O'Connor concerning the probable victor in Flor-
ida and a statement of her husband indicating that he thinks that she wants to
retire, slim evidence for a claim of "coup." Jack Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the
Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1440 n.98 (2001).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999); Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2000).
19. See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (opinion by Justice
Ginsburg, who dissented in Lopez v. United States, 514 U.s. 549 (1995» and
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that criminalization of
arson of private residence was beyond the scope of Congress's Commerce powers).
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the next election, in 2004, at which time it is not at all evident
that resentment over the United States Supreme Court's han-
dling of the 2000 Florida election will constitute a determina-
tive issue in the campaign.
As a consequence, I believe that the Dorf and Issacharoff
criticism of the United States Supreme Court in the Bush v.
Gore drama on political process grounds fails. Neither criti-
cism by the academy nor the refusal to confirm successor Jus-
tices constitutes accountability to the electorate. Moreover, as
the remainder of this Part explains, it is substantially more dif-
ficult than Professors Dorf and Issacharoff allow to determine
which actors in the Bush v. Gore drama most seriously inter-
fered with the ability of the Florida electorate to hold political
actors accountable for the outcome.
What exactly was the source of the harm to the political
process and to democratic accountability from the various
events of the disputed Florida election? What was the role of
the United States Supreme Court in contributing to whatever
democratic harm occurred? As we shall see, most of the criti-
cism of the United States Supreme Court's role in the Florida
election-including the criticism of Professors Dorf and Issa-
charoff-derives from examining the Court's actions as if the
United States Supreme Court were the only political institu-
tion involved in the dispute. In contrast, when the actions of
the United States Supreme Court are considered in light of the
preceding actions of the Florida Supreme Court, to which the
United States Supreme Court was necessarily responding, the
criticisms must be substantially amended.
Toward this end, it is helpful to briefly review the events of
the dispute. Florida election law, though not entirely without
flaws, established a straightforward mechanism for evaluating
disputed elections. According to Florida law, following an elec-
tion, each county canvassing board20 had seven days to report
its election results to the Florida Secretary of State.21 Within
that seven-day period, any candidate could "protest" the out-
come in any county. Upon a "protest," a sample was taken of
the ballots in that county, and if the sample revealed evidence
20. A canvassing board is a committee appointed internally within each
county to administer the election.
21. The procedures established by Florida election law are described in
much greater detail in the next Part. The detail is unnecessary here for evaluat-
ing the Dorf and Issacharoff political process criticism.
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of an "error in the vote tabulation" of sufficient significance to
affect the outcome, a manual recount of all ballots within that
county would be ordered. According to Florida law, if the man-
ual recount were not or could not be completed within the
seven-day period, the Secretary of State had discretion to ig-
nore the recount-even if it had been partially completed-and
certify the original vote. These features of the Florida election
law are uncontroversial. What actually happened?
Following the November 7 election in which the original
tally showed Governor Bush to be the winner, Vice President
Gore filed a "protest" of the vote in three Florida counties.
Samples of the ballots in those counties were taken and man-
ual recounts were ordered. None of the manual recounts, how-
ever, could be completed within the seven-day statutory period.
At the end of the seven-day period, on November 14, the Secre-
tary of State, invoking the discretion afforded her by the stat-
ute, certified the original tally in favor of Governor Bush. The
grounds that she gave for her decision to certify the original
tally, instead of waiting for a completion of the manual re-
counts, might be questioned, but were surely plausible. She
explained that, among other grounds, unless there were rea-
sons for delayed reporting beyond the control of the county
canvassing board-in effect, force majeure circumstances (hur-
ricanes, floods, fires, etc.)-the seven-day recount period pro-
vided for in the statute should be binding. Again, this is a
plausible exercise of discretion.22 According to the Secretary of
State's discretionary application of the statute, certification
. should normally occur immediately after the seven-day period
has run; certification can be delayed if events occur that are
clearly beyond the control of the county canvassing board that
impaired completion of any recount. Absent such concerns, the
original tally should be certified. Of course, given the electoral
results in the rest of the Nation, the effect of her certification of
the original tally in favor of Governor Bush was to ensure Gov-
ernor Bush's nationwide victory.
The next event in the dispute, however, was more dra-
matic. Suit was filed by the Palm Beach Canvassing Board
22. As explained in more detail in the next Part, Ms. Harris relied upon an
internal Division memorandum interpreting the provisions of the statute. Her
formulation of the grounds for delayed reporting was substantially broader than
the Division staff had determined. For a more detailed discussion ofthese events,
unnecessary for discussion here, see infra text accompanying note 39.
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(essentially represented by Gore attorneys) challenging the
various rulings of the Secretary of State. On November 21, the
Florida Supreme Court upheld the challenge and entered an
order in essence reversing Ms. Harris's decisions.23 The Florida
Supreme Court extended the November 14 deadline for com-
pleting the manual recounts to November 26. It also overruled
the Elections Division by interpreting the grounds for ordering
a manual recount-"error in vote tabulation"-to incorporate
error by a voter in indicating his or her preference. Finally, the
Florida Supreme Court stripped the Secretary of State of her
discretion with respect to vote certification by ordering her to
accept the results of the then-partial recounts, criticizing her
"hyper-technical reliance upon statutory provisions."24 The
Florida Supreme Court supported this ruling by invoking broad
principles of the Florida Constitution.
Although the subsequent details are not crucial for the dis-
cussion here,25 Bush v. Gore represents a decision by the
United States Supreme Court that, in effect, overturned these
actions by the Florida Supreme Court. The question I wish to
address is how should we evaluate these· various decisions
given the concerns of the political process theory? Professors
Dorf and Issacharoff, among others, criticize the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore as inconsistent
with the political process theory. Can the criticism be fully de-
fended?
To answer this question, I wish to move the analysis one
level back. Let us first ask, is there a justification in the politi-
cal process theory for the decision of the Florida Supreme
Court in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris to
take the administration of the disputed election out of the
hands of the Florida Secretary of State and to attempt to define
the recount mechanism itself?
I think not. Indeed, I believe that the exact criticisms that
Professors Dorf and Issacharoff have directed to the United
States Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore are equally applicable to
23. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.
2000).
24. [d. at 1227.
25. For a detailed discussion of the events between the Florida Supreme
Court's decision in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris and the
United State Supreme Court's decisions in Bush v. Gore I & II, see infra text ac-
companying note 45.
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the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court in Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board v. Harris.
The Florida Secretary of State is an elected official. In-
deed, she is the officer elected as the State's chief supervisor of
elections. The Florida election law, appropriately enacted, af-
forded her discretion to certify or not to certify the original tally
following the seven-day reporting/protest period. She exercised
that discretion on defensible grounds.
According to the political process theory, a court should de-
cline to defer to the judgments of elected officials only where
there appears some impediment to the exercise of subsequent
political accountability. Is there some impediment here? Not
in the slightest. As an elected official, the Secretary of State
can be held subsequently accountable by the citizenry; she, or
someone from her party, has to run for the office in the next
election.26 Similarly, and more generally, if the citizenry is un-
happy with the procedures prescribed by the Florida election
law, each Florida legislator can be held politically accountable
in the next election and the election law amended or over-
turned. There is no evident source that might impair subse-
quent political accountability.
As a consequence, the exact criticisms directed by Profes-
sors Dorf and Issacharoff (and others) against the United
States Supreme Court could and should be directed against the
decisions of the Florida Supreme Court. There are no grounds
under the political process theory for the Florida Supreme
Court to suspend its normal deference to legitimate decisions of
elected officials even if the Florida Court disagrees with them.27
26. It might be argued following the discussion of McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.s. (4 Wheat.) 316, 330 (1819), that there is a political accountability problem
in that the outcome ofthe Florida election determined the winner for the Nation,
not just Florida, and that none of the non-Florida national electorate possessed a
means of holding Florida officials, such as Ms. Harris, accountable. This is a mis-
taken analogy. The electoral outcome in Florida can only be determined by Flor-
ida citizens, not by citizens of other states. It was an artifact of timing and the
closeness of both the national and Florida elections that Florida became the de-
terminative battleground. This timing artifact cannot give citizens of other states
any right to a voice in the outcome of the Florida election.
27. Justices on the Florida Supreme Court are subject to retention in a de-
mocratic election though this fact does not make them democratically accountable
in exactly the sense of the political process theory. As Professors Dorf and Issa-
charoff insist, it is inconsistent with conceptions of an independent judiciary to
presume that judges are or should be politically accountable for individual deci-
sions in the manner of legislators or other political officials. Dorf & Issacharoff,
supra note 5. Thus, that some Justices of the Florida Supreme Court may later
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There, of course, is one principal difference between the re-
spective positions of the Florida and United States Supreme
Courts. The Florida Supreme Court's opinions remain subject
to Constitutional review by the United States Supreme Court.
But if we view the Florida Supreme Court's decision to wrest
control of the election process from the Secretary of State as, in
some sense, anti-democratic and, thus, inconsistent with the
political process theory, how should we evaluate the decision of
the United States Supreme Court to overrule the Florida
Court's decisions?
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Bush v.
Gore, in essence, restored the democratic accountability central
to the political process theory by reinstating the discretionary
decision of the Secretary of State. Admittedly, the United
States Supreme Court did not justify its decision in these terms
and, surely, the Court can be faulted for an inexpressive and
not fully worked out opinion, however drafted under conditions
resembling emergency. But the criticisms of Professors Dorf
and Issacharoff are not simply that the Court's opinion is weak
or inconsistent or, even, shallow. Instead, they claim that the
Court's decision violated the standards of political process by
arrogating to themselves-not to democratically elected offi-
cials-decisionmaking power over the election. This criticism, I
believe, is wrong.
As will be explained in more detail in the next Part, the set
of events leading up to Bush v. Gore can best be understood as
a battle between two courts over the mechanisms of control of
the election process in Florida. The Florida Supreme Court-to
my mind, in a manner totally contrary to the political process
theory-claimed through its decisions that it, not the elected
Secretary of State, should make the determinative political
judgment as to how the Florida election process was to be man-
aged. Although the Florida Supreme Court claimed to find a
basis in the Florida Constitution for this ruling, it is very diffi-
cult to assert that the Secretary of State's exercise of discretion
was lawless or otherwise constitutionally suspect.
The United States Supreme Court overruled the Florida
Supreme Court's various decisions toward this end. In doing
so, however, the United States Supreme Court made definitive
stand for reelection-or may not-does not provide political accountability to the
citizenry in the democratic sense.
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the earlier decisions of the elected Secretary of State. Thus,
substantively, the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court-not of the Florida Supreme Court-are most consistent
with the political process theory. In Bush v. Gore, the United
States Supreme Court reinstated control over the Florida elec-
tion process to the democratically elected official politically ac-
countable for those decisions, control that had been wrested
from that official by the Florida Supreme Court. As a conse-
quence, the United States Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore re-
stored to the citizens of Florida the power to hold politically ac-
countable the official responsible for determining how the
election was to proceed. By restoring the discretion that the
Florida election statute gives to the democratically elected and
democratically accountable Secretary of State, the United
States Supreme Court achieved an ultimate result in the case
much closer to the ambitions of democracy and the political
process theory than otherwise would have occurred.
II. JUDICIAL OVERREACHING: BUSH V. GORE AS A
CONSTITUTIONAL COUP
Far more damning than the criticism that the United
States Supreme Court acted in ways inconsistent with political
process norms is the accusation that the Court engineered the
stealing of the election in favor of Governor Bush more directly:
that the Court's decisions that, in essence, guaranteed Gover-
nor Bush's Florida victory, constituted a Constitutional "coup."
Perhaps the most prominent (more accurately, notorious)
statement to this effect is the public protest of "673 Law Pro-
fessors" who proclaim,
[W]e all agree that when a bare majority of the U.S. Su-
preme Court halted the recount of ballots under Florida law,
the five justices were acting as political proponents for can-
didate Bush, not as judges.
It is Not the Job of a Federal Court to Stop Votes
From Being Counted.
By stopping the recount in the middle, the five justices
acted to suppress the facts .... Suppressing the facts to
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make the Bush government seem more legitimate is the job
of propagandists, not judges.
By taking power from the voters, the Supreme Court
has tarnished its own legitimacy •.•. [W]e protest.28
Although the statement is not specific, the claim seems to
be that two decisions of the Court-on December 9 (Bush v.
Gore l), to stay the continuing recount that the Florida Su-
preme Court had ordered the previous day; and on December
12 (Bush v. Gore II), to terminate it-were both illegitimate
and constituted a seizure of power in which the Court substi-
tuted its preference for the election of Governor Bush in place
of the choice of Florida voters. This point is reinforced by the
use of the terms "taking power" or "COUp.,,29 Such terms imply
that, in its various decisions, the United States Supreme Court
asserted its authority illegally in wresting decision making
power from those actors who possessed legally legitimate au-
thority for determining the outcome of the election. To make
the point, the 673 Law Professors contrast the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court to the purported choices of Flor-
ida's voters. No one doubts that Florida's voters possess the
rightful authority to determine the winner of the Florida elec-
tion. And if the only actors in the drama were the United
States Supreme Court and Florida's voters, the claim of "coup"
might possess some plausibility. Once again, however, the
claim ignores the role of other institutional actors in the Flor-
ida election, in particular, the Florida Secretary of State and
the Florida Supreme Court. .
In order to appropriately evaluate the nature of the alleged
"coup" by the United States Supreme Court, it is necessary to
examine the underlying decisions of the Florida Supreme
Court, which the United States Supreme Court overturned. It
is also necessary to examine, in turn, the actions of Katherine
Harris, the Florida Secretary of State, which the Florida Su-
preme Court overturned. One can accuse the United States
Supreme Court of a Constitutional coup only if one can defend
28. 554 Law Professors Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2001, at A7, available at
673 Law Professors Say, http://www.the-rule-of-law.comlstatement.html.
29. It is my colleague, Bruce Ackerman, not quite the 673 Professors, who
claim the Court executed a "coup."
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without reservation the legitimacy of the decisions of the Flor-
ida Supreme Court overruling the Secretary of State.
Toward this end, it is helpful to briefly review the sequence
of the background events leading to the respective decisions of
the Florida and United States Supreme Courts:30
1) The election was held on Tuesday, November 7, 2000.
2) The next day, Wednesday, November 8, the Florida Di-
vision of Elections reported that Governor Bush had prevailed
over Vice President Gore by 1,784 votes. According to Florida
statute, given that small margin, an automatic machine re-
count was conducted31 reaffirming Governor Bush's victory, but
by a smaller margin.
3) The following day, November 9, the Florida Democratic
Executive Committee requested manual recounts in Broward,
Palm Beach, and Volusia Counties. The statute vests discre-
tion in each county canvassing board as to whether to conduct
a manual recount. If a board chooses to proceed, the statute
provides that it first conduct a sample recount to determine
whether there is evidence of "error in the vote tabulation,
which could affect the outcome of the election."32 If it finds
such evidence, the statute provides that the board shall:
(a) Correct the error arid recount the remaining precincts
with the vote tabulation system;
(b) Request the Department of State to verify the tabula-
tion software; or
(c) Manually recount all ballots.33
Procedures (a) and (b), above, obviously relate to errors caused
by machine or software failures. There was no complaint that
the voting machines did not operate as they were designed.34
That left procedure (c), the manual recount. Pursuant to the
statute, the canvassing boards of these counties conducted a
30. This history is related by the Florida Supreme Court in Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1225-27 (Fla. 2000).
31. FLA. STAT. § 102.121(4) (2000).
32. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(5) (2000).
33. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(5)(a}-(c) (2000).
34. There were, of course, serious complaints that the machines were ill-
designed to deal with (1) under-votes (where the machine read no vote for, say, a
Presidential candidate but had recorded votes for lesser officials; the complaint
here was that the machine was insufficiently sensitive to a voter's failed effort to
completely perforate the ballot); and (2) over-votes (where the machine had read
the ballot as voting for more than one candidate for President but some more care-
ful interpretation was possible).
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sample manual recount and concluded that there was a suffi-
cient increase in votes for Vice President Gore to justify a full
manual recount. At the same time, there was some uncer-
tainty as to what the term "error in the vote tabulation" meant.
The Chair of the Palm Beach Canvassing Board requested an
opinion from the Director of the Elections Division as to how
the statutory term was to be defined.
4) The Florida election statute also provides that each
county board must certify returns no later than seven days af-
ter the election,35 in this case, November 14. Fearing that a
comprehensive manual recount could not be completed by that
date, the Chair of the Palm Beach County Board requested a
separate advisory opinion from the Elections Division as to
what the consequences were if the manual recount in Palm
Beach extended past the November 14 deadline. The Florida
statute itself does not explicitly provide for exceptions to the
deadline. It states, however, in section 102.112, that "[i]f the
returns are not received by the department by the time speci-
fied, such returns may be ignored and the results on file at that
time may be certified by the department."36
5) The Elections Division responded to these various re-
quests for interpretive opinions on Monday, November 13.
First, in answer to the Palm Beach request as to the meaning
of "error in the vote tabulation," the Division reported that the
term meant machine or software tabulation error only.37 On
35. Upon penalty to members of the canvassing board. FLA. STAT. §
102.111(1) (2000).
36. FLA. STAT. § 102.112 (2000). Note that the preceding section 102.111
states inconsistently, "[ilf the county returns are not received by the Department
of State by 5 p.m. of the seventh day following an election, all missing counties
shall be ignored, and the results shown by the returns on file shall be certified."
(emphasis added). In its November 21 opinion in Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board v. Harris, the Florida Supreme Court made much of the inconsistency be-
tween the term "may be ignored" in section 102.112 and "shall be ignored" in sec-
tion 102.111, emphasizing the incoherence of the statute as a grounds justifying
the Court's intervention. 772 So. 2d at 1233-34. The Court's discussion seems
disingenuous since the term "may be ignored" of section 102.112 surely trumps
the "shall be ignored" of section 102.111. The Court's labored discussion of this
easily-resolved inconsistency appears (to this reader) as a pretext to justify the
Court's broad reinterpretation of the statute.
37. According to the Division, "[aln 'error in the vote tabulation' means a
counting error in which the vote tabulation system fails to count properly marked
marksense or punched punchcard ballots. Such an error could result from incor-
rect election parameters, or an error in the vote tabulation and reporting software
of the voting system. Therefore, unless the discrepancy between the number of
votes determined by the tabulation system and by the manual recount of four pre-
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this point, the Elections Division separately responded to a
similar inquiry from the Chair of the Florida Republican Party,
expressly rejecting the proposition that a failure of a voter in
marking or punching the ballot qualified: "The inability of a
voting systems [sic] to read an improperly marked marksense
or improperly punched punchcard ballot is not a [sic] 'error in
the vote tabulation' and would not trigger the requirement for
the county canvassing board to take one of the actions specified
in subsections 102.155(5)(a) through (C)."38
Second, with respect to the question as to whether there
could be an exception to the November 14 deadline if the man-
ual recount could not be completed, the Elections Division re-
ported that the only grounds for exception were unforeseen cir-
cumstances like a natural disaster that made compliance with
the deadline impossible.
[I]f the returns are not received by the department by the
time specified, such returns may be ignored and the results
on file at the time may be certified by the department. This
section contemplates unforeseen circumstances not specifi-
cally contemplated by the legislature. Such unforeseen cir-
cumstances might include a natural disaster such [sic] Hur-
ricane Andrew, where compliance with the law would be
impossible. But a close election, regardless of the identity of
the candidates, is not such a circumstance. The legislature
obviously specifically contemplated close elections in that
the law provides for automatic recounts, protests, and man-
cincts is caused by incorrect election parameters or software errors, the county
canvassing board is not authorized to manually recount ballots for the entire
county nor perform any action specified in section 102.166(5)(a) and (b), Florida
Statutes." DE 00-13, Manual Recount Procedures and Partial Certification of
County Returns, Nov. 13, 2000, L. Clayton Roberts, Director, Division of Elec-
tions, available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/de2000/deOO_13.html.
38. DE 00-11, Definitions of Errors in Vote Tabulation, Nov. 13, 2000, L.
Clayton Roberts, Director, Division of Elections, available at
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/de2000/deOO_11.html.Asimilar Advisory
Opinion was issued in response to a request by the Chair of the Broward County
Supervisor of Elections: ''Voter error in not an 'error in the vote tabulation.''' DE
00-12, Manual Recount Procedures, Nov. 13, 2000, L. Clayton Roberts, Director,
Division of Elections, available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/de2000/
deOO_12.html.
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ual recounts. It also plainly states when this process must
end.39
6) Later that day, Monday, November 13, Katherine Har-
ris, the Florida Secretary of State (a Republican and co-chair of
the Florida Bush campaign), issued a statement indicating
that, on the basis of the Division's Advisory Opinion and upon
the authority of section 102.112,40 she would ignore all returns
received after 5:00 P.M. on November 14.
7) Following Ms. Harris's statement, the Volusia County
Canvassing Board joined by the Palm Beach Board and Vice
President Gore sought declaratory and injunctive relief before a
Leon County Court, asking the Court to declare that the county
canvassing boards were not bound by the November 14 dead-
line and barring the Secretary of State from ignoring subse-
quently submitted election returns.
8) The next day (the date of the statutory deadline), No-
vember 14, the Leon County Court ruled that the November 14
deadline was mandatory, but that Volusia County could subse-
quently submit amended returns, and that the Secretary of
State was afforded discretion under section 102.11241 as to
whether to accept or ignore any amended returns. By the 5:00
P.M. deadline, all counties had submitted returns.
9) On the day following the deadline, November 15, the
Secretary of State sent a letter to the various county election
supervisors requesting them to submit to her any grounds that
they thought might justify a subsequent amendment of the
vote counts that had been certified by the November 14 dead-
line. In her letter to the county boards, she set forth three cri-
teria that she concluded, pursuant to her discretion, would jus-
tify post-deadline amendment: proof of fraud; substantial non-
compliance with election procedures; or the intervention of acts
of God or other circumstances beyond the control of the can-
vassing board that prevented reporting by the deadline.42 Her
letter provided supporting legal authority for each of these cri-
teria. Her letter went substantially beyond the single grounds
39. DE 00-10, Deadline for Certification on County Results, Nov. 13, 2000,
L. Clayton Roberts, Director, Division of Elections, available at
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/de2000/deOO_10.html.
40. FLA. STAT. § 102.112 (2000).
41. [d.
42. The text of the Harris November 15 letter appears in Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1226-27 n.5 (Fla. 2000).
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for exception-unforeseen circumstances such as a natural dis-
aster-given in the Election Division's November 13 Advisory
Opinion DE 00-10. Natural disaster was one ground of excep-
tion, according to Ms. Harris, but she presented two additional
grounds.
10) Four counties submitted statements in response to the
Harris letter. The same day, November 15, the Secretary of
State announced that none of the reasons given by the counties
in these statements qualified for exception according to the cri-
teria announced in her letter and that, therefore, she would not
accept amended returns. She indicated that the vote totals cer-
tified in compliance with the November 14 statutory deadline
would stand, to be adjusted only by the results from overseas
absentee ballots which, by stipulation with federal authorities,
could be counted if received by November 17.43
11) Finally, on November 16, the Florida Democratic
Committee along with the Vice President sought an order com-
pelling the Secretary of State to accept amended returns. Pur-
suant to Florida procedure, the trial court certified the issues
in the underlying litigation to the Florida Supreme Court and
enjoined the Secretary of State from certifying the results of
the Florida election until the appeal was decided.
The certified case was resolved by the Florida Supreme
Court in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris, is-
sued on November 21.44 The Court began its analysis by stat-
ing that the most important principle for determining how the
election recounts should proceed was vindicating "the will of
the people."45 In the Court's words, "the will of the people, not
a hyper-technical reliance upon statutory provisions, should be
our guiding principle in election cases."46 Later in the opinion,
invoking a provision of the Florida Constitution that states
43. The State of Florida had entered an agreement after a federal suit that
it would accept absentee ballots from overseas voters if received no later than ten
days after the election. The Florida Supreme Court also made much of the three-
day difference and of the unwillingness of the Secretary of State to accept
amendments following the seven-day deadline provided in the statute notwith-
standing the ten-day deadline established by the federal settlement. The Elec-
tions Division, however, had adamantly advised of the strictness of the November
14 deadline. DE 00-10, supra note 39 ("It [the statute] also plainly states when
this process must end."). The State's settlement of the federal suit, of course,
could not effect a general amendment of the election statute.
44. 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000).
45. [d. at 1227.
46. [d. This quotation appears in a Section entitled "Guiding Principles."
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that "all political power is inherent in the people,"47 the Court
added that "technical statutory requirements must not be ex-
alted over the substance of this right."48
Applying these principles, the Florida Supreme Court
ruled that
1) The Department of Elections' Advisory Opinion DE 00-
13 defining "error in vote tabulation" to exclude voter error in
punching the ballot was wrong as a matter of law. County
boards possessed the authority to manually review wrongly
punched ballots to determine "the will of the voter";49
2) The criteria announced by the Secretary of State for the
exercise of her statutory discretion to accept amended returns
were improper. The Court ordered the Secretary to accept
amended returns unless "their inclusion [would] compromise
the integrity of the electoral process";50
3) The county canvassing boards could continue manual
recounts regardless of the November 14 deadline and, indeed,
could have until November 26, to submit amended returns.51
Following this ruling, the manual recount resumed. Vari-
ous disputes arose within individual counties as to what the
standard should be for determining "the will of the voter," es-
pecially with respect to under-vote ballots-ballots which the
machines read as having no vote for President, but which indi-
cated votes for other positions (the single chad or dimpled chad
issue). As the new November 26 deadline approached, the can-
vassing board in Miami-Dade County concluded that it could
not complete the recount even within the extended period, and
halted recounting with approximately 9,000 under-votes not
reviewed. On November 26, the various counties amended
their certified returns. The new totals showed Governor Bush
again the victor, but now by only 537 votes.52
The drama, however, was not over. The Florida election
statute allows a candidate to "contest" the certified total to de-
termine whether the Canvassing Commission53 has included in
47. [d. at 1236 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1).
48. [d. at 1236-37.
49. [d. at 1227.
50. [d. at 1239.
51. See id. at 1240.
52. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2000).
53. The Florida Canvassing Commission is a three-person committee
charged to report the final certified totals. Its members are the Governor, the
Secretary of State, and the head of the Department of Elections. Because the
HeinOnline -- 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 972 2001
972 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol.72
the certified total any number of "illegal votes" or has failed to
include "a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in
doubt the result of the election."54 On November 27, Vice
President Gore filed a complaint in Leon County contesting
Governor Bush's 537 vote margin. The Leon County Court
held an evidentiary hearing on December 2 and 3, and entered
an oral order denying Gore relief on December 4.55
As these events occurred, the Florida Supreme Court's No-
vember 21 decision in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v.
Harris was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The
United States Supreme Court issued its ruling on the appeal on
the same day that the Leon County Court denied Vice Presi-
dent Gore's contest, December 4. In Bush v. Palm Beach Can-
vassing Board,56 the United States Supreme vacated the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's opinion, and remanded the case to the
Florida Court for further consideration. Presumably, from con-
cerns about comity, respect for the state court, or sensitivity to
the state supreme court authority, the United States Supreme
Court indicated only that it had concluded "that there is con-
siderable uncertainty as to the precise grounds for the [under-
lying] decision."57 At the same time, however, the Court listed
several substantive issues that it believed that the Florida Su-
preme Court had not adequately considered: (1) the United
States Constitution Article II delegation to the Florida Legisla-
ture of the right to direct how electors are chosen; (2) the safe
harbor provisions of 3 U.S.C. § 5; or (3) what constitutional or
statutory grounds there were for the Florida Court's extension
of the "7-day deadline ... by 12 days.,,58
The Florida Supreme Court chose to hear the appeal of the
Leon County Court's denial of the Gore contest of the vote total
certified on November 26, prior to readdressing the case re-
manded by the United States Supreme Court.59 The Florida
Florida Governor was the brother of the Republican Presidential candidate, he
recused himself and was replaced by the Florida Secretary of Agriculture. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1230 n.17 (Fla. 2000).
The Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, spoke for the Commission.
54. FLA. STAT. § 102.168(3)(c) (2001).
55. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2000).
56. No. 00-836, slip op. (U.S. Dec. 4, 2000).
57. Id. at 6 (quoting Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 555 (1940».
58. Id. at 4-7.
59. Hearing the Leon County Court appeal first allowed the Florida Su-
preme Court to order the resumption of the recounting of the Miami-Dade returns
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Supreme Court ruled on the Gore contest on December 8, in
Gore v. Harris,60 largely, though not entirely, overruling the
Leon County Court. First, the Florida Supreme Court over-
ruled the County Court's rejection of 215 Gore votes from Palm
Beach County and of 168 Gore votes from Miami~Dade County,
but affirmed the addition of fifty-one Bush votes from Nassau
County.61 Through these rulings, Governor Bush's November
26 margin of 537 votes was reduced to a margin of 205. More
importantly, however, because it kept· the election undeter-
mined, the Florida Supreme Court ordered the trial court to it-
self examine the 9,000 votes from Miami-Dade County which
the Miami-Dade election officials had declined to count because
of the impending November 26 deadline.62 At the same time,
the Florida Supreme Court ordered a statewide recount of all
under-votes, not just the 9,000 from Miami-Dade County.63
While the Florida Supreme Court's opinion in Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board v. Harris had been unanimous, Gore
v. Harris was a four-to-three decision. Chief Justice Wells is-
sued an extraordinary dissent that is worth reviewing because,
in my view, it was likely to have been highly influential with
the majority of the United States Supreme Court in its ulti-
mate decision in Bush v. Gore II. Though Chief Justice Wells
stated that he did "not question the good faith or honorable in-
tentions of my colleagues in the majority," he also concluded
that:
[T]o return this case to the circuit court for a count of the
under-votes from either Miami-Dade County or all counties
has no foundation in the law of Florida as it existed on No-
vember 7, 2000, or at any time until the issuance of this
opinion. The majority returns the case to the circuit court
for this partial recount of under-votes on the basis of un-
known or, at best, ambiguous standards with authority to
obtain help from others, the credentials, qualifications, and
and the extension of recounting to the entire state. As a matter of judicial econ-
omy, it surely would have seemed more prudent to address first the questions
raised by the United States Supreme Court, another ground for suspicion of the
Florida Supreme Court's motives.
60. 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000).
61. [d. at 1248.
62. [d. at 1262.
63. [d. The Court also affirmed the rejection of 3300 Palm Beach votes al-
leged to favor Gore, but which the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board had re-
fused to certify. [d. at 1248.
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objectivity of whom are totally unknown. That is but a first
glance at the imponderable problems the majority creates.
Importantly to me, I have a deep and abiding concern that
the prolonging of judicial process in this counting contest
propels this country and this state into an unprecedented
and unnecessary constitutional crisis. I have to conclude
that there is a real and present likelihood that this constitu-
tional crisis will do substantial damage to our country, our
state, and to this Court as an institution.64
Chief Justice Wells was particularly concerned about the ruling
ordering a new statewide manual recount of under-votes:
I do not find any legal basis for the majority of this Court to
simply cast aside the determination by the trial judge made
on the proof presented at a two-day evidentiary hearing that
the evidence did not support a statewide recount. To the
contrary, I find the majority's decision in that regard quite
extraordinary.65
The Chief Justice repeatedly insisted that the Florida Court
had not set forth any standards or procedures for recounting
the under-votes:
[SJection 101.5614(5) utterly fails to provide any meaningful
standard. There is no doubt that every vote should be
counted where there is a "clear indication of the intent of
the voter." The problem is how a county canvassing board
translates that directive to these punch cards. Should a
county canvassing board count or not count a "dimpled
chad" where the voter is able to successfully dislodge the
chad in every other contest on that ballot? Here, the county
canvassing boards disagree. Apparently, some do and some
do not. Continuation of this system of county-by-county de-
cisions regarding how a dimpled chad is counted is fraught
with equal protection concerns which will eventually cause
the election results in Florida to be stricken by the federal
courts or Congress.66
[TJhe majority returns this case to the circuit court for a re-
count with no standards.... It only stands to reason that
64. Id. at 1263 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1265.
66. Id. at 1267.
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many times a reading of a ballot by a human will be subjec-
tive, and the intent gleaned from that ballot is only in the
mind of the beholder. This subjective counting is only com-
pounded where no standards exist or, as in this statewide
contest, where there are no statewide standards for deter-
mining voter intent by the various canvassing boards, indi-
vidual judges, or multiple unknown counters who will even-
tually count these ballots.67
Chief Justice Wells also expressed serious concerns that the
Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the election statute
violated Article II's delegation of authority to determine the
manner of choosing electors to the Legislature and about the
implications of the continuing recount with respect to Florida's
qualification for the 3 U.S.C. § 5 safe harbor.68
Gore v. Harris was decided by the Florida Supreme Court
on December 8, and immediately appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. What the United States Supreme Court did
after December 8, has led to the charges of "taking power" and
"coup." First, on December 9, the day after the Florida Su-
preme Court ordered the additional Miami-Dade and statewide
recount of under-votes, the United States Supreme Court
stayed that order.69 Again, the recounting stopped. On De-
cember 11, the Florida Supreme Court released its revised
opinion in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris,70
the case remanded by the United States Supreme Court, af-
firming each of its earlier conclusions, but removing its expan-
sive discussion of the Florida Constitution. Finally, the United
States Supreme Court released Bush v. Gore II on December
12, reversing the Florida Supreme Court's order of the addi-
tional recount of under-votes and determining that no time re-
mained for principled recounting, effectively awarding the elec-
tion to Governor Bush.71
Given this sequence of events, how should we characterize
the United States Supreme Court's actions? Do they reflect, as
67. [d. at 1269.
6B. [d. at 1268-69.
69. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000).
70. 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000). Chief Justice Wells dissented on the ground
that the decision should wait until review of Bush v. Gore II by the United States
Supreme Court. [d. at 1292.
71. Bush v. Gore, No. 00-949, slip op. (U.S. Dec. 12,2000).
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charged, naked partisanship, a "taking" of power, a "Constitu-
tional coup"?
Charges of that nature seem strained. In retrospect, there
were strong reasons to suspect that a majority of the Florida
Supreme Court (each of whose members were Democrats) were,
themselves, pressing Florida law to keep open the possibility
that some manner of further recounting would generate enough
new "votes" to secure the election for Vice President Gore.
The Florida Supreme Court had been, to put the point
mildly, aggressive in its interpretation of the Florida election
statute. First and most importantly, in Palm Beach Canvass-
ing Board v. Harris, it had overruled, not the Secretary of
State's, but the Division of Elections' various Advisory Opin-
ions limiting the interpretation of the term "error in the vote
tabulation" to machine error, not voter error. This decision was
crucial to the entire drama because it transformed the recount
from a machine reading which could be completed immediately
(and which, presumably, could not be easily manipulated, but
which would guarantee victory for Governor Bush) into a
county-by-county subjective determination of voter intent with
an uncertain outcome. In addition, in the same opinion, the
Florida Supreme Court overruled the discretion that the stat-
ute afforded to the Secretary of State with respect to amended
returns, and unilaterally extended the statutory deadline by
twelve days. In its next opinion, Gore v. Harris, the Court
added a net 332 Gore votes, ordered the Leon County Court to
count the 9,000 Miami-Dade votes that the Miami-Dade Can-
vassing Board had declined to count, and out-of-the-air ordered
a statewide recount of under-votes.
Some have defended these various rulings of the Florida
Supreme Court as efforts to rein in the partisanship of the Re-
publican Secretary of State, Katherine Harris. 72 Harris was in
an unfortunate position as a Republican and, especially, having
served as co-chair (with the Presidential candidate's brother,
the Florida Governor) of the Florida Bush campaign. It surely
would have been wiser for her to recuse herself from any deci-
sionmaking with respect to the election, though she, in turn,
may have felt it necessary to stay in control in order to rein in
what she might have seen as the partisan decisions of the De-
72. See Ackerman, supra note 4.
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mocratic canvassing boards in Palm Beach, Broward, and Volu-
sia Counties.
Moreover, she was not the author of the Advisory Opinions
that the Florida Supreme Court overruled. The civil service
Division staff-not Ms. Harris-had generated the various Ad-
visory Opinions defining the term "error in the vote tabula-
tion," interpreting the deadline, and determining the criteria
for the acceptance of amended county returns.73 The Florida
Supreme Court insinuated partisan impropriety in Ms. Harris's
announcement on November 13, the day before the deadline,
that she would refuse to accept returns or amendments submit-
ted after the deadline.74 Perhaps her announcement was to-
tally partisan. But it is not inappropriate for a public officer to
announce in advance the manner in which she expects to exer-
cise her discretion, especially where the individual county can-
vassing boards may have been exerting great effort in conduct-
ing manual recounts that could not be completed by the
November 14 deadline. Moreover, the position she announced
only mirrored the determination by the Department of Elec-
tions in Advisory Opinion 00-13 which had been published ear-
lier that day. And the final criteria that she applied (following
the order of the Leon County Court) were substantially more
expansive than the single natural disaster exception inter-
preted by the Elections Division staff.
The claim of "Constitutional coup" has been buttressed by
the assertion that the grounds upon which the United States
Supreme Court overruled the Florida Supreme Court were a
pretext. In Bush v. Gore II, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the order mandating a statewide recount invoking Ar-
ticle II of the Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause, and
the ambition of the Florida Legislature to comply with the safe
harbor provisions of 3 U.S.C. § 5. These grounds seem hardly
pretextual. The Article II ground is serious because there were
good reasons to believe that the Florida' Supreme Court was in-
terpreting the election statute enacted by the Florida Legisla-
ture in totally unknown and unexpected ways. The Florida
Court began its opinion in Palm Beach Canvassing Board v.
73. Although each of these Advisory Opinions is signed by L. Clayton Rob-
erts, the Director of the Division of Elections, each indicates that the text of the
opinion was prepared by Kristi Reid Bronson, Assistant General Counsel.
74. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220,
1226, 1238 (Fla. 2000).
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Harris with the extraordinary statement, "the will of the peo-
ple, not a hyper-technical reliance upon statutory provisions,
should be our guiding principle in election cases.,,75 Similarly,
at a later point in the opinion, the Court stated, "[tlechnical
statutory requirements must not be exalted over the substance
of this right" (guaranteeing political power to "the people").76 It
is not implausible to interpret these statements as indicating
that the Florida Supreme Court was ready to enforce its defini-
tion of "the will of the people" without regard to the statutory
election rules enacted by the Florida Legislature, in violation of
the Article II delegation of authority to determine the method
of choosing Presidential elections: "in such a manner as the
Legislature [of each statel shall direct."77
The United States Supreme Court has been particularly
excoriated for its December 9 ruling in Bush u. Gore I staying
the continuation of the Miami-Dade and statewide recounts. 7S
The claim here is that it represents bad faith for the United
States Supreme Court to conclude on December 12, in Bush u.
Gore II that there is insufficient time for a further recount
when the Court itself had halted recounting three days earlier
in Bush u. Gore I.
The December 9 ruling by the United States Supreme
Court was without opinion. Justice Scalia issued a concurring
opinion which, given the emergency nature of the proceeding,
was probably unwise.79 In his concurrence, he presented two
reasons justifying the stay. The first was that the counting of
votes of questionable legality threatened irreparable harm to
Governor Bush "by casting a cloud upon what he claims to be
the legitimacy of his election."so This is the statement con-
demned in the protest of the 673 Law Professors,s1 and it is dif-
ficult to defend. Where time is of the essence, as it obviously
was with respect to a recount, even if the later totals were sub-
sequently ruled unavailable because of the statutory deadline,
continuing to count could not cause harm in any serious way.
75. Id. at 1227.
76. Id. at 1236-37.
77. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, d. 2.
78. See 554 Law Professors Say, supra note 28.
79. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2000). Justice Scalia defended the
concurrence as a necessary response to Justice Stevens' dissent, joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, which challenged the showing of irreparable harm.
80. Id.
81. See 554 Law Professors Say, supra note 28.
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The second reason given by Justice Scalia, however, is
more telling and, in fact, illustrates a problem with the recount
procedure that was more serious than Justice Scalia may have
recognized. Justice Scalia indicated that another issue in the
case was the varying county standards for determining the will
of the voter from examining under-votes-the dimpled chad,
hanging chad, equal protection issue. Justice Scalia concluded
that "permitting the count to proceed on that erroneous basis
will prevent an accurate recount from being conducted on a
proper basis later, since it is generally agreed that each man-
ual recount produces a degradation of the ballots, which ren-
ders a subsequent recount inaccurate."82 This is an important
point. I have substantial experience with empirical studies in
many different contexts.83 It has been my experience (and I
would expect, the experience of every other empirical worker)
that any empirical counting conducted prior to determining the
final standard for the count must usually be abandoned and
the counting begun again from the start once the appropriate
standard is determined. This means that, even if the Florida
Supreme Court were later to announce a standard for deter-
mining "the will of the voter" in the context of a punchcard un-
der-vote, each canvassing board would have to begin the re-
count again once the standard were announced.84 As a
consequence, no time was lost by virtue of the United States
Supreme Court's December 9 stay. That the counting process
itself led to degradation of the ballots only reinforces the con-
clusion.85
Finally, the strongest grounds refuting the claim that the
United States Supreme Court stole the election for Governor
Bush or engaged in a Constitutional coup is that its December
82. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2000).
83. See e.g., George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty,
90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); George L. Priest, Measuring
Legal Change, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 193 (1988).
84. The counting issue might have been different if each canvassing board
had recorded upon its review of each ballot what the chad condition of the ballot
was. Then, once a standard were announced, the appropriate total could be re-
constructed. Without this procedure, however, recounting would have to begin
anew after announcement of the standard. No county board, of course, was count-
ing the ballots in such a manner.
85. The stronger and more plausible defense of the December 9 stay is that a
majority of the Court recognized the persuasiveness of Justice Wells' dissent,
though they suspended final judgment. until briefing and argument.
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12 opinion in Bush v. Gore II so closely tracks the dissent of
Chief Justice Wells (a Democrat) in Gore v. Harris. Every
proposition upon which the majority of the United States Su-
preme Court defended halting the recount appears first in
Chief Justice Wells' dissenting opinion. Chief Justice Wells
states that there is no legal basis for the Florida Supreme
Court to order the statewide recount of under-votes.86 Chief
Justice Wells raises the Article 1187 and equal protection
claims.88 Many have criticized the United States Supreme
Court for emphasizing the 3 U.S.C. § 5 safe harbor provision,
arguing that the Court should have remanded the case to the
Florida courts to allow them-or the Florida Legislature-to
determine how important to them the federal safe harbor pro-
visions were. But Chief Judge Wells in his dissent emphasizes
those provisions, and argues that they provide strong reasons
to halt the recounting immediately.89 Finally, it is Chief Jus-
tice Wells who first raises the issue of Constitutional crisis and
who, in his dissent, warns his colleagues that crisis is upon
them unless they stop the recounting, necessarily leaving Gov-
ernor Bush the victor.90
As a consequence, the strongest defense to the claim that
the five-person, conservative, Republican majority of the
United States Supreme Court acted as partisans, seized power,
or executed a Constitutional coup is that the Chief Justice of
the Florida Supreme Court, a Democrat, seems to be the archi-
tect of the coup. There is not an argument in favor of cutting
off the Florida recount in the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Bush v. Gore II that was not presaged by Chief Jus-
tice Wells' dissent in Gore v. Harris. 91 This is a very peculiar
form of political coup.
86. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1263, 1265.
87. Id. at 1268.
88. Id. at 1269.
89. Id. at 1268-69.
90. [d. at 1263.
91. Chief Justice Wells' views on these issues were again signaled in the
Court's treatment of the remand of Bush v. Gore II from the United States Su-
preme Court. The United States Supreme Court remanded the case on December
12, as is typical, "for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." 531
U.S. 98, 111 (2000). On December 22, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court issued a
per curium opinion which stated, self-servingly, that its December 8 decision in
Gore v. Harris (the case overruled in Bush v. Gore II) had established a clear
standard for the recount-whether there was a "clear indication of the intent of
the voter"-that was the equivalent of the standard established by the Florida
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It is common-perhaps traditional-in United States Su-
preme Court scholarship to focus solely on the texts of Supreme
Court opinions, ignoring the opinions and judgments of those
lower federal and state courts who face the same issues at ear-
lier points. This practice or tradition surely derives from the
conclusion that, after the United States Supreme Court speaks,
all that has gone before is irrelevant.
In all great political dramas, however, there are many ac-
tors. Often, it is difficult to understand the actions of one with-
out understanding the actions of the others with whom the
one-here, the United States Supreme Court-must interact.
Though one might criticize the United States Supreme Court
for the results in the Bush u. Gore drama, in my view the prin-
cipal criticism is that it has not, to date, fully explained all that
it was taking into account in its decisions. It is abundantly
clear, however, that the United States Supreme Court's opinion
in Bush u. Gore II cannot be understood fully without examin-
ing the role of the Florida Supreme Court and, surely, cannot
be understood without appreciating the influence of Chief Jus-
tice Wells' dissent in Gore u. Harris.
Legislature. The opinion mentioned that the United States Supreme Court had
ruled that there was not sufficient time to define a more precise standard for bal-
lot review, and then commented:
upon reflection, we concluded that the development of a specific, uniform
standard necessary to ensure equal application and to secure the funda-
mental right to vote throughout the State of Florida should be left to the
body we believe best equipped to study and address it, the Legislature.
Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. 2000). Pointedly, Chief Justice
Wells separately concurred "only in the result," implicitly criticizing the ma-
jority's hypocritical and self-serving explanation of its decisions. Id. at 527.
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